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STUDENT ESSAY

THE TIES THAT BIND: CAPITALIZING ON THE EXISTING
SOCIAL FABRIC IN PUBLIC HOUSING TO REVITALIZE
NEIGHBORHOODS AND AVOID DISPLACEMENT IN PANAMA CITY, PANAMA

Tiffany D. Williams*

Introduction
Governmentally sponsored gentrification,' by way
of the demolition of public housing projects leaves many of
the world's poor out in the cold, with absolutely no opportunity to enjoy the purported benefits of pending development. From Rio de Janeiro, Brazil to Atlanta, Georgia,
neighborhoods established by governments as public housing projects or abandoned as slums have been transformed
into new havens for the affluent, with promises of affordable housing for those displaced ringing hollow in the

* Study Space Fellow, Center for Metropolitan Growth Georgia State
University College of Law. I extend my sincere thanks to the Center for
Comparative Metropolitan Growth at Georgia State University College
of Law for so graciously funding the research for this project through
the Study Space I Fellowship Program. Additionally, I thank Professor
Colin Crawford of the Georgia State University College of Law for his
admirable commitment to encouraging the legal academy to think
critically about the world in which we live.
1The term "gentrification" traditionally refers to the rapid or gradual
influx of affluent residents into traditionally poor neighborhoods. For
the purposes of this paper, I will refer to governmentally funded gentrification, which I use to refer to state action that relocates people already
living on governmental land in purported efforts to revitalize neighborhoods. This is distinguishable from traditional gentrification because
there the government is the primary actor, not private landlords. See
Powell & Spencer, infra note 2, at 435-50.
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background.2 This means that those unfortunate enough to
dwell on government land are fighting a growing battle
against displacement. 3 Moreover, they are fighting to preserve the valuable social fabric of their communities.4
Many champions of gentrification 5 point out that it pours
important economic resources into neighborhoods in disrepair.6 With regard to public housing specifically, proponents of this kind of demolition exploit horrifying crime
statistics and living conditions as evidence of the need for
complete overhauls. Unfortunately, these narrow analyses
fail to appreciate the value of preserving community identity as a tool to facilitate community improvement.
Panama City, Panama is currently undergoing rapid
urban growth.7 New roadway construction, neighborhood
renewal, and luxury high rise residential developments are
springing up all over the city.8 Indeed, the cityscape of
Panama City is beginning to resemble that of cities such as
2 See

generally John A. Powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them
the Old "One-Two": Gentrificationand the K.0. of Impoverished
Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 How. L.J. 433 (2003).
3 See Sean Purdy & Nancy H. Kwack, New Perspectives
on Public
Housing in the Americas, JOURNAL OF URBAN HISTORY 357 (2007).
Purdy and Kwack note the long-standing problem of urban housing by
quoting urban reformer Charles Abrams in 1964, Housing progress lags
far behind industrial progress in every part of the world. The technical
genius that broke the secrets of speed, sound, space, and light still
cannot build a house cheap enough for the rank and file... A Negro
laborer's family in New York and a squatter in Caracas may both have
television sets, but neither can afford a decent house. Id. at 357.
4 Powell & Spencer, supra note 2.
5 See generally J. Peter Bryne, Two Cheersfor Gentrification,46 How.
L.J. 405 (2003).
6Id. at 406. See also Eric Rogers, Out with the Old in with
the New:
Housing Issues for the Middle Class in Panama City, Panama.
7See generally Landau, infra note
9.
8 Parte II, Plan de Desarrollo Urbano de las Areas Metropolitanas
del
Pacifico y del Atldntico,
http://www.mivi.gob.pa/urbanismo/4URBANISMO/urbanismo/volume
n2b/puntol4nodall.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
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Miami Beach, Florida. 9 However, some neighborhoods do
not seem poised to benefit from this prosperity. One such
neighborhood is Curundfi, a low-income housing project in
Panama City that seems to be entirely isolated from the
growth so rampant in other areas of the city. l ° Curundfi is a
group of multiple unit, high-rise buildings originally built

as housing projects." Over time, this community has become one of the nine high crime neighborhoods in Panama
City listed by the Overseas Security Advisory Council in its
travel advisory. 12 Extreme poverty, violent crime, and
arson characterize Curundfi in Panamanian media. 13 The
cement structures of Curundfi are so dilapidated that many

9See generally Justin Gould, Trump: PanamaPropertyInvestment

Project, THE PANAMA REPORT, June 5, 2006,
http://www.thepanamareport.com/real-estate-in-panama/trumppanama-property-investment-423.html, Matt Landau, Investing Ahead
of the Growth Curve, PANAMA NEWS, May 6-19, 2008,
http://www.thepanamanews.com/pn/v 13/issue 09/opinion_01 .html.
10 See generally Entreculturas, Social Crisis in Panama City (June 6,
2007),
http://www.entreculturas.org/noticias/news/socialcrisis-inPanama-ci
ty (last visited Mar. 30, 2008). Entreculturas, a non-profit organization
doing community work in Curundfi, quotes the Social Pastora of the
Maria Reina Parish, [w]hat happens in Curundi and in neighboring
areas, is no accident, it is the consequence of a social exclusion process
which stems from a development vision which places the buildings,
tourist centres, exclusive residential areas and luxury commercial
centres, before the individual. Urban development has forgotten that
development should be for all, with equity, but what we can say of one
of the most unequal countries in the world. Id.
11See generally Entreculturas, supra note 10. Note that Curundil is
named after the Curundi River in Panama and should not be confused
with Curundfi Heights, which is situated in the former Canal Zone and
formerly housed American contractors and their families. Curundfi
Heights is now a middle-class neighborhood situated near a former Air
Force base.
12 See Overseas Security and Advisory Council Global Security News
and Reports, Panama City Crime and Safety Report (2007),
http://www.osac.gov/Reports/report.cftn?contentlD=62157.
13 See generally Entreculturas, supra note 10.
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residents have opted to build their own informal residences
on the grounds of the development. Despite this despair,
the people who call Curund-d home have a shared community history and identity.1 4 Should gentrification take place
in Curundfi, as seems likely given its convenient location in
the city center, residents will risk losing this history and
identity which facilitates their way of life. Additionally,
they will find themselves in a disadvantageous bargaining
position because they live on governmentally-owned land
and have few financial resources. This paper will examine
options available to governments to "revitalize" communities like Curundfi without causing extreme social and physical displacement in the face of rapid urban growth.
Part I of this paper will briefly discuss the history
and current state of the Curundfi housing project in Panama
City. Curundf provides an interesting point of reference
where gentrification is concerned because the neighborhood is centrally located in Panama City,1 5 yet neither its
structural landscape nor the characteristics of its inhabitants
appears to be substantially affected by the rapid pace of
development in other parts of the city.' 6 Given the combination of central location, poorly maintained structures,
extreme poverty, and crime, Curund-i is a prime candidate
for Panama's government to use city wide "urbanization"
as an opportunity to demolish Curundfi and build more
attractive and profitable housing for the numbers of people
relocating to the city.
Part II will discuss models of governmentally sanctioned gentrification in two communities that share some
14

/d. This is not to suggest that the people of Curundfi have one ho-

mogenous identity; rather, they are neighbors sharing a common struggle to preserve their livelihoods. Recently, for example, many have
joined organizations to tackle gang violence and arson in their communities.
'5Curundhi is situated in the Northwest end of the city near the Panama
International Airport.
16See generally Entreculturas, supra note 10.
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characteristics with Curundfi: Techwood & Clark Howell
Homes in Atlanta, Georgia and Cidade de Deus-the "City
of God" neighborhood-in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Both
communities discussed in this section are similar to Curundfi in that they are massive housing developments within cosmopolitan cities where inhabitants have few property
rights and are significantly affected by poverty and crime.
Yet, they differ from each other because the Atlanta developments began as public housing projects with the state
converting them to mixed-income neighborhoods, while
Cidade de Deus, originally a public housing project in Rio
de Janeiro, was constructed when the governing military
dictatorship forcibly removed inhabitants of the Catacumba
favela, which was located in the more fashionable parts of
the city, in 1970. I7 In both instances, crime and poverty
continue as problems in those communities after the governmental intrusion. Thus, the policy decisions made in
both Atlanta and Rio de Janeiro regarding development
may demonstrate that effective, long-term community revitalization as a tool to reduce concentrations of poverty and
crime require that the government to do more than merely
build new structures and move inhabitants around.
Finally, Part III will discuss governmental approaches to remedy the problem of public housing that do
not require the demolition of vital community ties to resources in the event that governments do demolish buildings.
An example of an attempt at this kind of
comprehensive legislation is HOPE VI in the United States,
which requires housing authorities to focus on selfsufficiency and resident improvement as a means to community revitalization. Although HOPE VI has been used as
a means to demolish neighborhoods, legislation of its kind
17 Janice

E. Perlman, Longitudinal Panel Studies in Squatter Communities: Lessons from a Re-study of Rio's Favelas: 1969-2003 2, 3 (2003),
http://www.megacitiesproject.org/Lessons-from Rio RE-study_19692003.pdf.
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has the potential to provide governments with tools to repair public housing structures while strengthening the existing social fabric through resident involvement, selfsufficiency training, and community-oriented crime prevention.
I.

Squalor Amidst Sprawl:
The Curund6i
Housing Projects in Panama City, Panama

Though the Curundfi housing projects were originally built for low-income Panamanians, the majority of
Curundfi's population is now composed of Colombian
refugees from the Choc6 region of Colombia.' 8 The cement high rises of Curundfi are fully inhabited and hundreds more live in informal housing on the property
grounds. 19 Thus, Curundd is a hybrid community, with
both formal public housing units built by the government,
like those in Techwood and Clark Howell Homes in Atlanta, and informal housing units like those in the favelas of
Brazil. 20 Common among all three community groups-in
Atlanta, Rio de Janeiro and Panama City-is the absence of
land rights for the residents. All of the inhabitants live on
governmentally owned land and therefore have significantly diminished bargaining power where issues concern-

Choc6 region of Colombia is inhabited largely by indigenous
people and African descent populations. See Jesuit Refugee Service,
JRS Dispatch No.216, Panama: Second Arson Attack in Cumndfi,
18The

(May 31, 2007),
http://www.jrs.net/news/index.php?lang=en&sid=2050.
19
In the documentary film, Curundi, filmmaker and producer Ana
Endara Mislov followed a Curundfi resident named Kenneth and exposed the isolation and poor conditions experienced by Curnd6i residents. See Ratll Leis, Curundz , THE PANAMA NEWS, Jan. 20, 2008Feb. 2, 2008,
http://www.thepanamanews.com/pn/v 14/issue_02/opinion 02.html;
see also Entreculturas supra note 10.
20 Leis, supra note 19, Entreculturas supra note 10.
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ing community development arise. 2 1 Additionally, afflictions such as crime, poverty, and dilapidated structures run
22
rampant among the communities.
As is the case in many poor, inner-city communities, the pressures of scarcity have produced a high crime
rate in Curundfi. 23 While gang violence224 and drug trafficking flourish, the structures in the community are under
frequent attack. 25 On January 18, 2008, Curundfi fell victim to its third major fire in six months.2 6 In March of
2007, an entire sector of the neighborhood was destroyed,
leaving 500 residents homeless.27 In May of 2007, another
fire left 355 homeless. 28 Both the March and May fires
were reportedly gang-related arsons. 29 Thus, both the peo21 Perlman,

infra note 35, at 107-36. To be clear, inhabitants in some

favelas often buy and sell their homes, so in a sense there are semiformal property rights among residents, but favela residents by definition do not have legal title to their land. Moreover, in 1970, the people
of the Catacumba favela had no legal claim to their land, which is why
the government bulldozed the neighborhood without giving any kind of
compensation to the residents. Present day favelas are not the favelas
of 1970. Indeed, Perlman's research reflects that favela inhabitants
now enjoy many of the material trappings of those in the "formal"
world, such as televisions and name brand clothing. Also, due to both
grassroots organization among favela residents and more recent governmental legislation, those living in favelas often have access to electricity, indoor plumbing, and roads. Further, living conditions in some
favelas
are superior to conditions in other so-called formal housing. Id.
22
See generally ARIAS FOUNDATION FOR PEACE AND HUMAN PROGRESS,

infra note 23.

23 ARIAS FOUNDATION FOR PEACE AND HUMAN PROGRESS,
THE FACE OF URBAN VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA,
ARMS, VIOLENCE & YOUTH SERIES (2006),

Panama,In

at 241, 252-56,

http://www.arias.or.cr/download/INGLES.pdf.
24 Id at 253. The murder rate in 2003 for Curundfi is 108.7 murders per
100,000 individuals, making it the highest murder rate in the city. Id.
25 Jackson, infra note 31.
26 Jesuit Refugee Service, supra note 18.
27 Id.
2
8 id.
29 Id. See also Jackson, infra note 3 1.
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pie and the structures of Curundti appear to be falling apart

under very dangerous conditions.
Aside from diminishing residents' sense of personal
security, arson also diminishes the number of housing units
available to them. 30 In the wake of crises caused by these
fires, the need for adequate housing becomes even more of
a concern for those displaced. Some members of the Panamanian press have criticized the reaction of the Ministry
of Housing to the fires because, according to reports, authorities bulldozed debris resulting from a recent fire before
residents were able to recover their belongings, including
zinc roofing that could be used to rebuild informal housing. 31 The Ministry reportedly plans to rebuild housing to
replace damaged units, but only residents who qualify will
be allowed to move back in. It is unclear whether residents
who lived on the grounds in self-built structures would
qualify to live in the new housing. 32 Efforts to revitalize
Curundfi must consider the quality of the existing relationships in the community. Violence and crime inevitably
damages those relationships. One factor that may affect the
cohesiveness of the Curundfi community is that the social
fabric is very much a patchwork, consisting of Panamanians, Colombians, and poor immigrants from other nearby
countries who arrived at various points in the neighborhood's history.33 For example, when interviewed about
crime in Curundfi, an immigrant cited that Panamanian
30

Jackson, infra note 31. The informal housing in Curundfi are often
wood structures and are therefore more susceptible to fire damage. Id.
31 Eric Jackson, Three Kids Killed, Alleged PerpetratorsHeld, Curundjj
Burns in GangRow, Police Show of ForceIneffective, THE PANAMA
NEWS, April 2007, available at
http://www.thepanamanews.com/pn/vl 3/issue 07/news_03.html.
32

Id.

33 Janice E. Perlman, Marginality: From Myth to Reality in the Favelas
of Rio de Janeiro, 1969-2002, in MARGINALITY: FROM MYTH TO
REALITY IN THE FAVELAS OF RIO DE JANEIRO 1968-2005, 109 (forthcoming) http://www.megacitiesproject.org/myth to reality rio 1969-

2002.pdf.
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gangs were responsible for the crime in the neighborhood.34
Although historical lines along which community ties are
traditionally formed are not necessarily as pronounced in
Curundi as in communities with a strong presence of families who lived in that neighborhoods for decades, there is
still an opportunity for Curundfi residents to unite through
the shared experience of living in a neighborhood that has
been permitted to deteriorate before the country's very
eyes. 3 Indeed, the example of Rio de Janeiro proves that
people from different origins are capable of forming very
strong community ties.
II.

Public Housing Meets Gentrification:
Atlanta, Georgia and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

This section will discuss the governmentally sponsored
gentrification of the public housing projects Clark Howell
and Techwood Homes in Atlanta, Georgia and the Catacumba favela in Rio de Janeiro. Transitions in Atlanta
housing were the product of aggressive planning centered
around the Centennial Olympic Games in 1996, which
forced the city to improve conditions in and around downtown Atlanta. Clark Howell and Techwood Homes were
demolished and were replaced with mixed-income housing.
The Catacumba favela in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil was razed
in 1970 and inhabitants were moved to housing projects
such as Cidade de Deus, in outlying areas of the city. Cidade de Dues is now characterized as a favela because of

34 Jesuit Refugee Service, supra note 18.
35 See Newman, infra note 40, at 6. In the City of Atlanta, a shift in the

demographic of the Clark Howell/Techwood Homes communities
changed when Clark Howell became integrated. Whites fled the project and blacks from rural areas and other parts of the United States
moved into public housing projects in Atlanta. Likewise, the favela
communities in Rio de Janeiro are now composed of people from
different parts of the country and other parts of South America. Id.
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the extreme poverty and number of irregular housing units
on the grounds.
In both Atlanta and Rio, residents were isolated by the
transition process, their relationships to one another and the
city being largely disregarded. Also in both cities, residents organized and fought actively against displacement,
thereby forming valuable community ties. This section will
discuss the ways in which residents were isolated, it will
argue that perhaps isolation is partly responsible for governmental failures to revitalize these communities while
also maintaining the social fabric.
A. Techwood Homes and Clark Howell
Homes in Atlanta, Georgia
The City of Atlanta has undergone substantial
growth over the past two decades.36 Much of the housing
redevelopment was sponsored by the Atlanta Housing Authority with substantial involvement from city officials. 37
An analysis of the gentrification of Atlanta's housing projects of Techwood Homes and Clark Howell Homes may
provide insight into the possibilities for Curundfi because
the state of public housing in Atlanta during the time these
projects were demolished was similar in significant ways to
the current state of affairs in Curundi. Namely, both housing projects were in a state of disrepair, suffered from numerous vacancies, and saw their residents primarily
concerned with crime. Now the area is the site of a new
mixed-income community, a new YMCA, a new elementary school, and Olympic landmarks. Unfortunately, few of
the original residents of these communities are in a position
Mary Lou Pickel, Metro Atlanta 2 nd in growth nationwide, ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Mar. 27, 2008.
37 Ronald Smothers, Barcelona Games Start, And Atlanta
is Staring,
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1992, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9EOCE5DA 143BF934
Al 5754COA964958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all.
36
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to enjoy these amenities since they have been relocated to
distant parts of the city.
The first public housing projects in Atlanta were
built during the Great Depression as an effort to stimulate
the economy through creating jobs.3 8 Due to the high demand for low-income residences during these years and the
high quality of housing units produced, applicants for public housing were carefully screened on the basis of several
criteria, including race. 39 Techwood Homes opened first in
1935 for low-income whites, originally housing 604 families.40 University Homes was built soon thereafter for lowincome blacks. Clark Howell Homes was erected in 1940
adjacent to Techwood Homes for low-income whites and
was the last housing project to be built in Atlanta during
this era.4 1
The City of Atlanta suffered tremendously when
thousands began to abandon the city center for the suburbs,
causing the concentration of poverty to increase significantly. The end of racial segregation in public housing also
played a role. The desegregation of Atlanta resulted in race
no longer being an acceptable criterion for placement in
38

HARVEY K. NEWMAN, ATLANTA HOUSING AUTHORITY'S OLYMPIC
LEGACY PROGRAM: PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS TO MIXED INCOME
COMMUNITIES, 6 (2002),

http://aysps.gsu.edu/publications/researchatlantaAHA%20%Olympic%
20Legacy%2OProg.pdf [Hereinafter Report]. The construction of the
projects provided employment opportunities to those affected by the
Depression. Id. See also DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, A HISTORICAL AND BASELINE ASSESSMENT OF HOPE VI,
VOL. 1 4-2. (1996).
39 Newman, supra note 40, at 6. Residents were screened on the basis

of
race, family composition, employment, and living habits. Id.
40
Id.When Techwood Homes was built, apartments had closets in
every room, new kitchen appliances, and built-in bathtubs, which was
quite a step up for many new residents who had just relocated from the
"'slum" of Techwood Flats. Id. See also DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 40.
41 , i
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housing.4 2 Thus, many whites fled formerly white only
43
housing projects that would soon be inhabited by blacks.
Despite the departure of those white residents, the need for
public housing in Atlanta continued to grow. 44 Urban renewal efforts and expressway construction during the
1960's and 1970's in Atlanta displaced thousands of poor
blacks.4 5 Additionally, many blacks had already begun
migrating in large numbers into Atlanta and other major
cities between 1940 and 1970.46 Although the demand for
public housing grew in Atlanta, the number of inhabitants
steadily declined.4 7 Meanwhile, the metropolitan area 4 8
continued to grow after 1970.49 To illustrate, the popula42Newman, supra note 40, at 6-7. Public housing applicants were also

no longer being screened according to family composition or employment.
Id.
43
1Id. at 7.
44 Id.

45Id at 6. Newman says that 67,000 people were displaced because
of

expressway construction and urban renewal, at least 77% of whom
were African-American and all of whom were described as "poor and
disadvantaged with special needs and special problems." Id. See also
Kevin Fox Gotham, Redevelopmentfor Whom andfor What Purpose,
in 6 RESEARCH IN URBAN SOCIOLOGY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
URBAN DEVELOPMENT 441-42 (Kevin Gotham ed., 2001) ("[A]s the

history of urban renewal, gentrification, and urban expressway building
shows, central city divestment and reinvestment are part of the dynamics of urban race relations, with African Americans and other minorities
having to bear the brunt of displacement and neighborhood destabilization.").
46 Newman, supra note 40, at 7. Newman's research showed that over
54 7 million blacks moved to cities during this time period. Id.
Id.

48 The Atlanta metropolitan area is defined by the United States Census
Bureau as the 5,392.8 miles encompassing Barrow, Bartow, Cherokee,
Clayton, Cobb, Coweta, DeKalb, Douglas, Fayette, Forsyth, Fulton,
Gwinnett, Henry, Newton, Paulding, Rockdale, Spalding, & Walton
Counties. See Department of Housing and Urban Development, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE ATLANTA METROPOLITAN AREA V

(2005),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/hl 70-04-21.pdf.
49
Newman, supra note 40, at 7.
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tion in the city was 496,973 in 1970, as compared to
394,017 in 1990. At the same time, the population of the
outlying suburbs grew to 1.5 million people. 50 Thus, the
population in public housing in Atlanta grew just as hundreds abandoned the city, resulting in a social and physical
isolation that persisted until the 1990s.
The decrease of the city's population and increase
in public housing tenants were met with an increase in the
level of poverty. Between 1980 and 1990, though the
number of poor people in the metropolitan area decreased,5 ' the percentage of poor people within the city
limits jumped from 82.7 percent to 84.1 percent. 52 Thus by
the 1990's, public housing expansion, mass migration, and
other externalities 53 left Atlanta with one of the highest
concentrations of public
housing per capita of any city in
54
the United States. In fact, Atlanta had the second highest
concentration of public housing in the nation, second only
to Newark, New Jersey.55 By the 1990s, housing projects
Techwood Homes and Clark Howell Homes were 56
recognized as some of the worst neighborhoods in Atlanta.
By the 1990s, Atlanta's entire public housing system had hit embarrassing lows in the areas of maintenance
and management. When Atlanta was selected to host the
1996 Centennial Olympic Games (Games) in 1990, the
proximity of several potential competition sites to dilapidated public housing projects forced city officials to quick-

50 Id.
5' For a

definition of the Atlanta metropolitan area, see DEPARTMENT
OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 50 at v.
52

Newman, supra note 40, at 9-10.

53 Id.
54 Newman, supra note 40 at 7. According to Newman, one often

residents of the City of Atlanta lived in public housing by 1990. Id.
55 Id.
56

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note

40, at 3-22.
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ly address a myriad of public housing issues. 57 By this
time, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) pronounced the city's public housing problem one
of the worst in the country because of exceedingly poor
management and maintenance by the Atlanta Housing
Authority (AHA).5 Thus, in 1990, the AHA and city officials seized the opportunity to use the Games as a catalyst
to create the Olympic Legacy Program (OLP) which was
an effort to reduce the concentration of poor people living
in Atlanta by converting public housing projects near
Olympic Game sites into mixed income communities.59
The combined 1,845 units in Techwood Homes,
Clark Howell Homes, and one other property 6 1 were the
first properties targeted by the OLP. Aside from decreasing
the concentration of poor residents in the city, other justifications cited for the OLP included (1) providing adult residents with expanded employment opportunities through
interaction with diverse residents sharing the apartment
complex; (2) improving education by providing children
with diverse learning environments; (3) providing children
with role models from different income levels; and (4)
decreasing the crime rate. 62 Despite its purported merits,
57

Newman, supra note 40, at 10-12.

58

See id. at 8. (In 1994 HUD threatened Atlanta and Chicago with the

prospect of having their housing authorities taken over by the federal
government. In 1994, HUD gave the Atlanta Housing Authority a
score of 39 of a possible 100.)
59
1Id. at 13.
60
Id. at 4. See also DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT supra note 40, at 4-2. (Techwood Homes and Clark Howell
Homes constituted 52.9 acres of land in Atlanta's center near Georgia
Institute of Technology).
61 The other property targeted was the East Lake Meadows
Community
in DeKalb County, Georgia. This paper discusses only the Clark How-

ell/Techwood Homes communities because they are located in the
Atlanta city center and were commonly regarded as one property. See
Newman, supra note 40, at 15.
62 See id. at 4.
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the OLP was subject to public scrutiny in part because its
implementation was precipitated by an increase in evictions
for minor lease infractions, an official AHA refusal to accept partial payments that had been acceptable before the
plan, and increased security concerns prompted by increasing vacancies on the properties. 63 Moreover, only 545 of
the 1,115 households in residence in 1990 received relocation assistance from the AHA. 64 Of that number, over
half 65 received Section 8 vouchers 66 and the next largest
group of residents were moved into other public housing
projects. Those who did not receive relocation assistance
most likely moved or were evicted before demolition commenced. 67 Before the Games commenced, the AHA had
relocated 1,576 families from these areas.68 These families
were often moved to outlying suburbs while renovations
took place. 69 After demolition, 1,442 units were constructed.7 °
63

1Id. at 12.

64Id. at 13.
65

367 residents received Section 8 vouchers. Id. "Section 8" require-

ments appear at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2000), which provides for lowincome housing assistance whereby private owners enter into contracts
with the federal government of the United States of America whereby
they are permitted to rent units to low-income residents where certain
conditions are met.
66 According to HUD data, residents receiving vouchers were widely
dispersed throughout the city and the eastern county of DeKalb, but
were still clustered in seven concentrated groups throughout the city.
Those who were not clustered are scattered across 87 neighborhoods in
the city. See Newman, supra note 40, at 18-19.
67 The AHA stopped keeping track of many of the families who were
evicted or moved independently. Additionally, 76 families were
evicted, 106 "skipped out" on rent and 14 moved without assistance. Id
at 18.
68 See id. at 5. The numbers of families relocated as a result of the
OLP: 114 from Techwood, 588 from Clark Howell Homes, 470 from
East Lake Meadows, and 434 from other projects.
69 See id. at 18.
70

Id. at 4.
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While the OLP has arguably attained the broad objective of decreasing the concentration of poverty in the
City of Atlanta, it has left many residents in the same condition or worse than when the project began. 7 ' Further,
although merely substituting Section 8 Vouchers7 2 for public housing decreased the concentration of poverty in certain areas, the overall number of poor living in the city has

not changed significantly, especially considering that over
80% of those receiving vouchers remained in the City of
Atlanta.7 3

Critics have questioned whether the OLP's primary
purpose was to improve conditions for residents in projects
like Techwood and Clark Howell or whether it was merely
a slum clearance project to make accommodations for private interests. 74 Like many public housing projects, Techwood and Clark Howell Homes suffered both geographical
and social isolation from larger society.75 Techwood and
Clark Howell were not surrounded by other important large
neighborhoods; they were surrounded by a major institution
of higher learning, Georgia Institute of Technology (Geor-

71 Praise

for the mixed-income community that has replaced Clark

Howell/Techwood and Centennial Place gives too little attention to the
fact that few of the original residents have benefited from the new
development. See Keating, infra note 80. For an example of the kind of
praise the Centennial Place community has received, see also Ken
Edelstein, A New Mixed-Income Village for Downtown Atlanta, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 1996 at 5, Barney Simms, PoorAtlantans have more
choices now, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Sept. 14, 2007, at
Al, Newman supra note 40, at 18-19. (83% of those relocated from
Clark Howell and Techwood Homes remained inside the city, which
means that the actual number of poor people in Atlanta did not decrease
significantly.) Id.
72 Section 8 vouchers are provided pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1437f
(2000).
73 Newman, supra note 40, at 18-19.
74 See generally id. at 20.
71 Id. at 10-13.
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gia Tech), and by Coca-Cola Headquarters. 76 Both Georgia
Tech and Coca-Cola are major fixtures in the City of Atlanta and have extensive resources. 77 Over the last forty
years Georgia Tech had demonstrated their power several
times by expanding into nearby neighborhoods. Furtherpushed to remove
more, Coca-Cola executives had long
78
Clark Howell and Techwood Homes.
A closer look at the proactive measures taken by the
AHA prior to the implementation of the OLP provides
significant insight into the possible root of the Authority's
failure. The AHA invested very little in the residents of
Techwood and Clark Howell Homes despite the dire need
for resources among tenants. In 1993, the median household income for families in Techwood and Clark Howell

76

DEPARTMENT OF HOusING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note

59, at 4-20. See also, Newman, supra note 40, at 20.
77 Coca-Cola's net profits for 2007 totaled $5.981 Billion Dollars.
Forbes Magazine, Coca-Cola At a Glance, available at
http://finapps.forbes.com/finapps/j sp/fmance/compinfo/CIAtAGlance.js
p?sedol=2206657. Georgia Tech has one of the largest endowments
among colleges and universities in the United States at $1.3 Billion
Dollars. Georgia Institute of Technology, Recent Trends and Milestones, June 2007.
78 Larry Keating & Carol A. Flores, Sixty & Out: Techwood Homes
Transformed by Enemies & Friends,26 J. URBAN HIST. 275, 284
(2000). Keating and Flores explain the climate surrounding the integration of Clark Howell Homes:
The shift in racial composition alarmed Paul Austin, chief executive officer of Coca-Cola, Techwood's neighbor to the
west. In a memo to Robert W. Woodruff, the dominant figure
in much of the Coca-Cola company's success, Austin voiced
the fear that when Techwood and Clark Howell became 'all
black, the felony rate will triple.' To avoid the perceived
threat, Austin proposed demolishing the communities, removing the residents to the outskirts of the city, and redeveloping
the property with an ultra modem middle-income community.
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respectively were $3,960 and $3,960.' 9 Only 14% of
households in Clark Howell had actual earned income and
only 15% of Techwood households did.80
Furthermore,
AHA properties experienced a spike in crime during the
late 1980s. 8 1 Yet, AHA did very little to address the issues
of crime and poverty in communities. Structures, not people, appeared to be the AHA's primary focus. The AHA
had only a small security force to work in senior citizens'
buildings and only forty five police officers enrolled in the
AHA community policing program. 82 Further, AHA was
one of the housing developments evaluated that provided
residents with absolutely no drug treatment/prevention
programs; they were also one of five major U.S. cities who
83
offered no resident services or self-sufficiency programs.
B. Catacumba Favela to Cidade de Deus,
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Cidade de Deus, a public housing project turned favela in Rio de Janeiro, was built to house the former inhabitants of the Catacumba favela 84 after they were displaced
by slum clearance policies promulgated by the former dictatorship government of Brazil85 . Catacumba was situated
79

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,

supra note

58
80 at 1-24.

id.

81Id at

2-12.

82 Id at 2-12. Exhibit 2-4.

83 id.
84 Janice Perlman, Marginality:From Myth to Reality in the Favelas of
Rio de Janeiro,1969-2002 (2002). According to Perlman, Cidade de
Deus also housed families from other razed favelas in Rio, but it was
rmarily populated by former Catacumba residents.
Perlman, supra note 35. Informal housing developments or shantytowns are often referred to as favelas in Brazil. Favelas are typically
thought of as squatter settlements established by families infringing on
public land to which they have no rights. Although it was established
as a public housing project in 1970 Cidade de Deus is now considered a
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in the upscale South Zone of Rio de Janeiro. Not surprisingly, the elite of the South Zone felt threatened by the
close proximity of the favela to their homes. Eventually,
the dictatorship responded by systematically evicting Catacumba's residents and relocating many of them to public
Carlos Lacerda,
housing on the outskirts of the city. 86
then governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro, established the
removal plan. Despite vigorous opposition from grass
roots community groups, 2,074 families in Catacumba were
to public housing projects
removed in 1970 and relocated
87
such as Cidade de Deus.
In the larger national context, favela eradication was
an ineffective tool for redressing poverty or the lack of
affordable housing in Rio. Despite the government's later
attempts to integrate favelas into the city through "formalizing" them with electricity, indoor plumbing, and public
roads, favelas continue to grow in number, size and complexity. 88 In fact, the number of favelas in Rio has nearly
doubled since 1969.89 Janice Perlman reports that
[I]n every decade between 1950 and 2000, Rio's
favela population grew much more rapidly than
the city as a whole with the exception of the 1970s
when favela eradication programs forcibly removed over 100,000 people into public housing or
sent them back to the countryside. Most striking
is that during the period 1980 to 1990, when the
favela due to the growth of informal housing on and near the original
6roperty grounds.
Id. Many Catacumba residents also went on to populate a strip of
favelas called Complexo del Mar6, located near the airport in Rio.
87 id.
88 Perlman, supra note 84, at 107. The Brazilian government cites three
factors as being responsible for the spike in population in favelas: (1)
migration from towns in the Brazilian countryside: higher fertility rates
among favela residents; and migration from favelas outside of the city
to favelas within the city.
"9Id.at 107.
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overall city growth rate dropped to 8% but favela
populations surged by 41%. Then, from 1990 to
2000, when the city's growth rate leveled off at
just less than 7%, favela populations continued to
grow by 24% resulting in a current all-time high
percentage of Rio's population. These numbers
demonstrate that Rio de Janeiro's housing needs
continue to climb. Much of this growth has been

attributed to immigration from migrants from the
countryside and, more recently, movement from
within the city.
Perlman studied the success rate of favela residents who
had been relocated thirty years after her 1968 study and
found that community ties were especially important in
predicting the success of residents. Her 1998 study revealed that former Catacumba residents who were relocated
in 1970 have enjoyed higher rates of success 90 than those
relocated from other favelas and housing projects largely
because of the strong community network Catacumba residents formed through organizing to resist eviction.9" She
suggests that after eviction and relocation Catacumba residents kept in touch with one another and were able to help
90 Pelman's study traced life trajectories across four generations: the

original interviewees, their parents, their children and their grandchildren. In her words, she Combine[d] qualitative and quantative methods
including direct observation, in-depth open-ended interviews, participatory re-creation of the community history in each community, (using
the DRP - Rapid Participatory Diagnostic - method), the application of
survey instruments (questionnaires), the collection of life histories, and
the reanalysis of existing data sets and research materials. We work
with the concepts of transgenerational transmission of poverty, inequality, marginality, exclusion, and social mobility.
Janice E. Perlman, LongitudinalPanelStudies in Squatter Communities: Lessonsfrom a re-study ofRio 'sfavelas: 1969-2003, WORLD
BANK WORKSHOP, URBAN LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
LONDON, May 28-29, 2003.

91Perlman, supra note 83, at 109.
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each other more than those in other communities. 92 Perlman tells the story of a woman named Marga 93 who was
one of the 17,000 families removed from Catacumba in
1970. 94 She was relocated to a housing project in the outskirts of the city called Conjunto de Quintungo, but said
that the former residents of Catacumba would remain her
life-long friends. 95 When Marga was forced to relocate due
to threats from a neighborhood gang in the housing project,
she stated that being so far away from her support network
was unmanageable and she hoped to be able to move back
96
to a neighborhood closer to the city sometime soon.
Perlman's findings suggest that while community ties are
not destroyed by demolition, if conditions were actually
improved in communities like Catacumba without moving
residents farther away from resources such as education
and employment, the ties could be leveraged to achieve
sustainable, livable communities.

92

Perlman, supra note 84, at 109-10. In the caption to figure 5.5. she

states that
The location in the midst of the upscale residential South
Zone gave residents abundant access to service and construction jobs as well as to the good schools and clinics in
the area. Despite their removal in 1970 to disparate housing
projects, their common struggles created strong communal
ties which persist to this day. Id.
93 Id. at 110-12. Marga was born and raised in Catacumba and grew up
to raise two young children while living in Catacumba. She was a
domestic worker, and as such, she lived with her employers during the
week with her children and then lived in the favela over the weekend.
Because of this living arrangement, her children were able to attend
better schools because she could use her employers' address. This was
not possible after relocation because of the sheer distance of her new
home to potential employers' homes. Some relocated families were
by as much as four hours of travel. Id.
separated
94
1d.

95

at 108.

See generally id. at 111.
96
Id. at 111-12.
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While the favela population continues to grow in
Rio, public housing projects like Cidade de Deus are themselves becoming favelas since these public housing projects
are dominated by informal settlements and characterized by
crime and desperate conditions. 97 Perlman's 1969 study9 8
suggested that people living in favelas were not truly mar-

ginal; rather they were stigmatized by their neighborhood:
"[i]t is my contention that the favela residents are not economically and politically marginal, but are excluded and

repressed; that they are not socially and culturally marginal,
99
but stigmatized and excluded from a closed class system."
She suggested that the formation of favelas demonstrated a
desire on the part of the people to establish a functional
way of life. 10 0 Perlman's more recent research shows that
the stigma attached to being from a favela is far more negative than the stigma attached to living in Brazilian public
housing. 10 1 However, this stigma reattaches itself once
public housing transforms into a "favela."
Social stigma
97

Id. at 142. See also James Brooke, Rio Slum Children Find Death in
'City
of God', N.Y. TIMES, November 3, 1980.
98
JANICE PERLMAN, THE MYTH OF MARGINALITY: URBAN POVERTY

(Univ. of Col. Press 1976).
99 Perlman, supra note 83, at 121.
100
Id. Perlman states that... the marginality ideology was so strong in
Brazil in the 1970s that it created a self-fulfilling prophecy. In particular, the favela-removal policy it justified perversely created the conditions it was designed to eliminate. In fact, the favela was an extremely
functional solution to many of the problems faced by its residents. It
provided access to jobs and services, a tightly knit community in which
reciprocal favors mitigated hardship, and above all, free housing. This
AND POLITICS IN RIO DE JANEIRO,

was clearly not the case in the housing projects ... to which favela

residents were consigned by the government. In the government projects, they were separated from kin and friendship networks; located far
from jobs, schools and clinics; and charged monthly payments beyond
their means. Relocation also diminished family earnings by eliminating many of the services and odd jobs family members could perform
after school, while caring for children, or when filling in time between
other tasks. Id.
101Id.
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affects everything from a resident's ability to find employment to the way in which she formulates her dreams. Thus,
the failure to provide acceptable housing with measures in
place to encourage the neighborhood maintenance ensures
10 2
that the residents will always be marginalized.
III.

Possible Answers for Curundfi: CommunityFocused Legal Responses to Public Housing
in Need of Community Revitalization

In examining the relationship between the gentrification of low-income communities and concentrated poverty, John A. Powell and Marguerite L. Spencer assert that
"with its displacement of low-income residents, gentrification and perpetuation of concentrated poverty are not opposite trends, but actually operate similarly and
recursively. Both push low-income people of color away
0 3
from resources, opportunities and vital institutions."'
Like many others' ° Powell and Spencer recognize that lowincome families have few options for relocation when they
are displaced because of their limited resources."' If few
places remain in the city where families can access affordable housing, they are forced to move to less desirable
locations where employment, education,
and other necessi1°6
access.
to
difficult
more
are
ties
Government has a special duty to address a wide
spectrum of issues that affect conditions in public housing
such as structural integrity, maintenance, crime, concentrated poverty, and social mobility of residents. While
government provision of public housing is a valuable and
necessary resource for low-income residents, with this
102 See generally Perlman,
103
104

supra note 83, at 126.
Powell & Spencer, supra note 2, at 441.
See, e.g., J. Peter Bryne, supra note 5 (complaining of the wealth

of scholarly discourse discouraging gentrification).
105

106

Powell & Spencer, supra note 2, at 442.
id.
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provision comes the governmental responsibility of maintenance and oversight. In the United States and abroad,
many public housing projects have become dilapidated
because of government neglect.'0 7 Such was the case in
Atlanta with Techwood and Clark Howell Homes before
they were demolished and in Cidade de Deus and other
Brazilian public housing projects after they were constructed.'10 Additionally, poverty is highly concentrated in
and around public housing. 10 9 Thus, the issue of poverty
must be considered when implementing public housing
policy. 110 Crime also remains a paramount concern to
public housing residents in most countries."' When government bodies fail to give adequate attention to the value
of human capital in public housing residents, they become
complicit in a system that creates a permanent class of
people who will always live in public housing. By failing
to involve residents in the improvement process, authorities
place limitations on the progress that is made and alienate
the supposed beneficiaries from the benefits of revitalization.
Too often, the above negative factors are considered
intrinsic to the people of a community. The result is that
rebuilding does not give enough attention to the existing
strengths of residents because the residents are seen as the
107See

Florence Roisman, Keeping The Promise:Ending Racial Dis-

criminationAnd SegregationIn FederallyFinancedHousing, 48 How.
L.J. 913 (2004). See generally DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 76.
108 Because favelas are informal settlements, the Brazilian government
had no legal responsibility to maintain any properties on the Catacumba
favela before its destruction.
109
Florence Roisman, IntentionalRacial Discriminationand Segregation by the FederalGovernment as a PrincipalCause of Concentrated

Poverty: A Response to Schill and Wachter, 143 U. PAL. REV. 1351
(1995).
'

1

°See id. at 135.

See generally Purdy & Kwack, supra note 3.
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problem. 112 For example, in the United States, HUD addressed crime in housing projects and vilified residents by
imposing a zero-tolerance policy for its residents. In HUD
v. Rucker, the Supreme Court permitted local housing authorities to evict tenants of public housing when household
members or guests were in violation of anti-drug policies,
even if the tenant was unaware of the drug activity."" 3 In
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, government raids on narcotics dealers and gangs in favelas are common practice. 114 In Curund-i, the Panamanian Ministry of Housing responds to
arson in the community by bulldozing debris and promising
new housing for "qualified" families. 115 In these scenarios,
lawful citizens suffer a double assault, first from criminals
and then from the government. Often, positive results can
be obtained when the governments of high-crime areas
assist residents in organizing to minimize the occurrence of
and mitigate the effects of criminal activity; however, this
can occur only when residents are made to feel a part of the
community improvement
process, rather than objects of
1 16
harsh regulation.
Thus, the people in public housing rather than the
system in which they are trapped are considered to be the
problem. The policy models like those in Atlanta and Rio
de Janeiro, which primarily involved the construction of
new structures and citizen relocation, are ineffective in
112 Perlman, supra note 86, at 122.
113See Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S.
114 See e.g., Stuart Grudgings, Elite Police Squad Courts

in Brazil, REUTERS/BOSTON

GLOBE,

125 (2002).
Controversy

July 1, 2008, available at

http://www.boston.com/news/world/latinamerica/articles/2008/07/0
itepolicesquad courts controversy inbrazil/.
115
116

2 /el

Jackson, supra note 31.

In Rio de Janeiro, the Primer Entrega program, which means "first
job" is doing what the government has struggled to do, by providing
job training, extra-curricular education and artistic courses for people
living in a Rio favela. Primer Entrega seeks to change the conditions in
the favela by changing the lives of the people. Visit of Tiffany Williams to Cidade AltaFavela, Primer Entrega Program, June 2006.
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addressing the roots of the deplorable conditions governments allegedly seek to improve, because those programs
1 17
merely cause a geographic shift in concentrated poverty.
Further, in both Atlanta and Rio de Janeiro, the government
left significant numbers of families without housing or
forced families to relocate to parts of the
city that were far
11 8
away from their places of employment.
By contrast, if Curundfi faces a state-sponsored
overhaul, its population could benefit from policy implementation that acknowledges the unique value of social
networks and support systems to working-class communities that is often disrupted when they are forced to move
miles away from those resources.11 9 The conditions in
Curundfi reflect the need for comprehensive approaches to
rebuilding long neglected public housing properties both to
improve the quality of life for residents and the general
welfare for the city.
A. Existing Panamanian Governmental Programs
In October 2007, Panama's Minister of Housing
proposed legislation that would give inhabitants in 10,360
public housing units title to their land based on the number
of rent payments they had made to the state. 12 Residents
who paid rent for at least sixteen years would receive full
See Roisman, supra note 109. (noting that by failing to address
issues like social mobility, residents have few options to work themselves out of public housing.
118 See generally Newman, supra note 40, at 5.
119 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note
58, at v. With regard the relationships among neighbors in distressed
public housing, the report stated, "[d]espite the socio-economic difficulties faced by these communities and their residents, some also
benefit from a rich network of community resources including churches
and non-profit organizations whose staffs and members provide important services and political leadership." Id.
120 Winner, infra note 123.
117
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title, and those who had paid rent at least 199 times would
receive partial title of between 25% and 75%. 121 This initiative simultaneously acknowledges that public housing
inhabitants acquire informal yet recognizable interests in
their communities that cannot be entirely disposed of merely because of their lack of property rights and the importance of formal property rights to the empowerment of
residents. However, the focus on homeownership does not
adequately address the fact that inhabitants in places like
Curundfi lack the financial resources to accomplish the kind
of structural improvement the community requires. Additionally, squatters have presumably never paid rent and will
not benefit from any transfer of title.
While the Ministry's legislation regarding transfer
of title has not yet been enacted, the Ministry of Housing
has proposed other programs intended to provide inhabitable housing to the poorest of Panamanians. 122 PROVISOL, the Program for Supportive Living, provides a $2,000
subsidy to families earning less than $300 per month toward the purchase of a home upon a determination of creditworthiness. 123 The Program for Integral Improvement of
Neighborhoods (PROBEMA), is a two part strategy that
seeks both to (1) modernize physical infrastructure and (2)
provide social programs and employment training. 24 It
does not appear that inhabitants of Curund-if could benefit
substantially from PROVISOL because a mortgage subsidy
is not helpful in a community where most of the housing is
substandard or uninhabitable. However, PROMEBA inDon Winner, Panama to Give Government Owned Apartments to
the Poor, PANAMA GUIDE, http://www.panama-guide.com (Oct. 4,
2007).
122 Ministerio De Vivienda - Republica De Panamd, Resumen Pr6sta121

mo De Innovaci6n 3 [Ministry of Housing, Republic of Panama,
Innovation Loan Summary], available at
7
.html.
http://www.mivi.gob.pa/paginasprincipales/programas0
123
id.

124 id.
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volves the improvement of existing structures and the promotion of property rights and not the elimination of a particular community. 125 This combination of goals is a more
comprehensive approach because it provides services to
residents, which suggests an acknowledgement that the
residents are important components of community improvement.
B. The Potential of HOPE VI as a Legislative Framework to Reinforce the Community Fabric
The United States has attempted to encourage housing authorities to be creative when attempting to address
the housing problem because authorities must address poverty, crime, structural maintenance, and community service
to receive funds. If implemented and enforced responsibly,
HOPE VI has the potential to be a useful tool to revitalize
neighborhoods because of the broad latitude granted to
housing authorities in planning. In 1993, the U.S. Congress
attempted to improve distressed public housing through the
Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere
Program (HOPE VI). 126 HOPE VI provides government
grants to overhaul severely distressed public housing
through rehabilitation, reconfiguration, demolition with onsite, off-site or Section 8 voucher replacement housing, and
development of additional low-income and market-rate
housing. 127 Some or all of these options can be combined
into the plan for a single development, but demolition has
Id.
126 HOPE VI was first enacted in 1993 and was subsequently revised in
1995. The revision to HOPE VI eliminated the requirement that housing authorities replace demolished unites on a 1:1 ratio. See Newman,
supra note 40, at 12.
127 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note
40, at 5-3, 5-4.
125
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been integral to most HOPE VI sites to date. 128 This is
unfortunate because development that focuses on demolition and relocation alienates targeted communities from the
planning process.
HUD asserts that HOPE VI funding can accomplish
the Department's goals by investing in "sites, buildings,
and people."' 29 Indeed, HOPE VI projects could include
efforts like those in PROMEBA and PROVISOL in Panama. However, it appears that the "people" HOPE VI
funds have been used to benefit may not always be public
housing residents. As of 1996, the implementation of social programs and resident involvement in HOPE VI projects has been marginal at best.' 3 0 The City of Atlanta's
use of HOPE VI funds demonstrates the potential for housing authorities to overemphasize the component of demolition and neglect the requirements for community and
residential services. 13 1 Both Techwood and Clark Howell
were listed among the worst for the level of resident involvement in 1996.132 In fact, Atlanta was found to have
actually discouraged resident involvement although residents were represented
by legal counsel during HOPE VI
133
proceedings.
Indeed, Atlanta paled in comparison to cities like
Charlotte where authorities built on relationships estab128

Id. at 1-26. Exhibit 1-7 shows that demolition on the table for all but

seven of the thirty four HOPE VI projects that participated in the study
while renovation was only proposed for eleven properties.
129 Id. at ii.

"' DEPARTMENT

OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note
58, at vi-vii.
131 Initial HOPE VI plans for Techwood and Clark Howell involved

renovation, but plans changed to demolition. See id. at 5-6, exhibit 5-2.
132 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note
58, at vii.
133 Id. at 5-13, 5-14, exhibit 5-4. Atlanta residents were forced to seek
legal representation to be involved in the HOPE VI process. Georgia
legal services negotiated a "Further Assurances Agreement," that called
for continual involvement of residents throughout planning. Id.
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lished from existing community organizations. Atlanta was
described as having only "a small array of programs to
support special projects or events" at the time HOPE VI
funding was obtained, 134 whereas resident involvement and

community organization seemed to be integral to Charlotte's process before and during planning. 135 Charlotte
employed a resident consultation model, involving several
existing community groups in the planning process as well
as at least 30 residents. 136 The residents' input was then
incorporated into Charlotte's HOPE VI plan.
Charlotte's policy preceding the implementation of
HOPE VI also demonstrates that community involvement
can serve as a vehicle to address crime without depending
37
on the city's police force or minimal security resources.
Even before the receipt of HOPE VI funding, Charlotte had
36 resident organizations sponsoring numerous services
through two integral programs, the Drug Abuse, Treatment,
Outreach, and Prevention Program (DATOP) and the Safe
Neighborhood Awareness Program (SNAP). 138 Both DATOP and SNAP have reduced crime by 15 percent in targeted developments. 139 Thus, Charlotte is reinforcing and
even strengthening the valuable community ties that Perlman emphasizes in her findings in order to preserve com34

Id. at 2-16, exhibit 2-5.
Id. at 5-14. HOPE VI requires that each participating city shall
make contributions for supportive services in an amount equal to 15
percent of the funding provided for supportive services and that these
contributions
shall be derived from non-Federal sources. Id. at 1-9.
3
115

16 Id. at 5-14.
37

1

Id. at 2-16, exhibit 2-5.

'38 Id. While DATOP does involve the eviction of tenants who have
found to be engaged in drug-related activity, it involves residents. The
program "trains and supports a youth advisory council aimed at developing drug education and prevention and provides on-site out-patient
treatment and after-care. Id. at 2-15. Another program sponsored by
the housing authority in Charlotte trains teens to recognize symptoms
of drug abuse so that they may help their peers obtain treatment. Id.
39

Id. at 2-14.
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munities. The community members are involved in the
preservation and rebuilding process of their neighborhood.
HOPE VI requires self-sufficiency resources for
residents, to encourage social mobility. Charlotte had already implemented two programs, Gateway and Stepping
Stone, before they obtained HOPE VI funding. 140 Both
programs have become national models for transitional
housing programs. 141 To further encourage social mobility,
Charlotte formed the Homeownership Institute of the Charlotte Housing Authority, which used HOPE VI funding to
educate selected residents about "all aspects of homeownership" over a period of 13 months. The program's success
rate is 75 percent-meaning that 75 percent of its graduates
have bought or will buy a home. 142 Again, this effort focuses on the potential of residents to overcome their obstacles to become even more useful members of their
community without completely removing them from their
social network.
HOPE VI is not by any means perfect, but it at least
provides housing authorities with a framework in which to
work to address the many facets of community improvement including using existing ties in communities to help
neighborhoods help themselves. By providing for community service, residential service, self-sufficiency support,
crime-prevention and educational services in the statute,
residents are empowered to form specific expectations of
the government. They may also be more encouraged to
become involved in the planning process, like the citizens
of Charlotte. Also, by providing for renovation, remodeling in addition to demolition, HOPE VI gives housing authorities room to explore and apply creative solutions to the
low-income housing problem. Communities like Curundfi
140 Id. at

2-16, Exhibit 2-5.

141Id.
142 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HOPE VI:

COMMUNITY BUILDING MAKES A DIFFERENCE

(2000).
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may benefit from broad legislation like HOPE VI because
they may employ the strength of their existing community
ties to work with the government to improve their conditions.
IV.

Conclusion

The world's poor are fighting to keep roofs over
their heads. Unfortunately, the people are too often perceived as the root of, and not solutions to, the affordable
housing crisis. Accordingly, it seems that governments too
often seek to remove people instead of thoughtfully addressing problems. In Atlanta, the Atlanta Housing Authority alienated the residents of Techwood and Clark
Howell Homes from the planning process and relocated the
majority of them to neighborhoods distant from their original homes. Now, a new mixed-income community, a dormitory, YMCA, elementary school and other resources sit
where Techwood & Clark Howell once were 143, but many
of the former residents live so far away that they cannot
enjoy these amenities.
In Rio de Janeiro, the Brazilian
government razed favelas in an attempt to rid the city of the
problem, but thirty years later, the number of favelas is far
greater than it was in 1970. Further, public housing designed to house former favela residents have themselves
become favelas, carrying with them the debilitating stigma
that residents may have thought they escaped.
Curundfi sits in the center of a city that is rapidly
transforming itself before the world's eyes. Still, the incidence of violent crime and arson does not seem to be subsiding. Police raids and bulldozers are not solving the
problem. Thus, the Panamanian government today has the
opportunity to take a holistic approach to improving Curundfi for the benefit of its residents. Undoubtedly, the
entire city too can benefit from improvements in CurundAi.
143 Id.
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Instead of adopting the common approaches of demolition
and relocation, Panama should leverage the collective power of residents to prove that overcoming housing obstacles
does not require that they entirely deny the existing residents opportunity to enjoy the benefits that revitalization
brings.
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